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DOJ-007 — Independent Investigative Counsel Appointment and Accountability Act (Independent Alternative)

This proposed enabling legislation depends on ratification of the Independent Investigative Counsel Amendment. It is the complete independent alternative for Congress to enact if it rejects the Interbranch Review Framework Act (JUD-011) and the preferred DOJ-007 Shared-Framework Implementation Act.

A BILL

To establish procedures for judicial appointment, authority, independence, accountability, and termination of independent investigative counsel in extraordinary cases of executive conflict.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Independent Investigative Counsel Appointment and Accountability Act.”

SEC. 2. PURPOSES.

The purposes of this Act are to ensure that credible allegations involving the President or senior executive officials cannot be suppressed because the subjects control the ordinary investigative chain; provide a bounded independent fact-finding path when credible information suggests possible serious criminal or investigative misconduct but Congress lacks the political will, institutional capacity, or reliable factual record necessary to initiate an adequate inquiry; preserve evidence and congressional access during presidential tenure; protect investigation from presidential interference; permit lawful prosecution of other persons within assigned jurisdiction; investigate serious misuse of federal investigative or prosecutorial authority even where presidential immunity may bar prosecution; and preserve impeachment as the constitutional mechanism for removal of a sitting President.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

A covered official includes the President, Vice President, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Solicitor General, FBI Director or Deputy Director, White House Counsel, Cabinet officers, senior Executive Office personnel, senior DOJ political appointees, and persons whose investigation presents a substantial conflict for executive leadership.

Credible information means specific and articulable information providing a reasonable basis to believe that a federal offense, obstruction, retaliation, evidence destruction, concealment, unlawful interference with federal law enforcement, or serious abuse of investigative or prosecutorial authority may have occurred.

An extraordinary executive conflict is an actual or objectively reasonable conflict materially impairing DOJ’s capacity or perceived capacity to investigate impartially.

The Special Division is the judicial panel established by section 4. The Independent Investigative Counsel is the inferior officer appointed under this Act.

SEC. 4. SPECIAL DIVISION.

A three-judge panel of United States courts of appeals shall be selected through a random and publicly prescribed Judicial Conference procedure, with no two judges from the same circuit and staggered terms. Judges shall be disqualified from any resulting criminal case.

The Special Division may decide whether appointment conditions exist, appoint counsel, define or modify jurisdiction, receive required notices, adjudicate removal, and determine completion. It may not direct investigative steps, charging decisions concerning other persons, plea negotiations, litigation strategy, sentencing positions, or good-faith departures from nonbinding DOJ policy.

The Special Division shall operate independently under this Act. Its clerk, secure-record, facility, technology, personnel, and administrative requirements shall be provided from amounts appropriated under section 13. No judge or decisional employee assigned to a civil proceeding concerning the same underlying conduct may participate in an application, supervision, access dispute, removal matter, or completion determination under this Act.

SEC. 5. AUTHORIZED APPLICATIONS AND REFERRALS.

A verified sealed application may be submitted by the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General; an Inspector General with related jurisdiction; the Office of Government Ethics Director; either House by resolution; either Judiciary Committee by majority vote; a bipartisan one-third minority of either Judiciary Committee; or an Article III court making a qualifying referral.

A court may refer a matter when it has found executive conduct unlawful, the record contains substantial and credible information of a possible federal offense, related obstruction, retaliation, evidence destruction, concealment, or serious misuse of federal investigative authority, and an extraordinary executive conflict may impair ordinary investigation. A notice or public-register entry under JUD-001 or JUD-005 does not itself satisfy these conditions and may be submitted as supporting material only through an authorized application. Such a referral is not a finding of guilt, probable cause, corrupt intent, impeachability, extraordinary executive conflict, or entitlement to appointment and is not admissible to prove an offense.

Private persons may submit information to an authorized applicant but may not petition the Special Division directly.

SEC. 6. APPOINTMENT STANDARD.

The Special Division shall appoint counsel only upon written findings that credible information indicates a possible federal offense, related obstruction, retaliation, evidence destruction, or serious abuse of investigative or prosecutorial authority; the matter concerns a covered official or presents extraordinary conflict; ordinary recusal or reassignment is inadequate; and appointment is necessary and proportionate.

Submission by an authorized applicant does not create entitlement to appointment. The Special Division shall independently review the application and may deny appointment if the statutory conditions are not satisfied, if lesser measures are adequate, or if appointment would be unnecessary or disproportionate.

The order shall identify the subject matter, jurisdiction, institutional conflict, powers conferred, reporting requirements, and reasons lesser measures are inadequate. Public and sealed versions shall be issued consistent with investigative integrity, grand-jury secrecy, classification, and individual rights.

SEC. 7. QUALIFICATIONS, APPOINTMENT, AND TERM.

Counsel shall be a United States citizen and attorney in good standing with substantial federal criminal, judicial, or complex-litigation experience; demonstrated independence and integrity; no material conflict; and no recent representation or senior political service for a principal subject.

Selection shall be merit-based. Counsel shall take the constitutional oath and serve until completion or lawful termination. Appointment under this Act is an alternative to, not a replacement for, lawful executive appointment of special counsel.

SEC. 8. JURISDICTION.

Jurisdiction includes the matters identified in the order; federal offenses arising from the same course of conduct; obstruction, retaliation, false statements, witness tampering, evidence destruction, and concealment affecting the investigation; persons who aid or conspire in such conduct; and serious use or attempted use of federal investigative or prosecutorial authority without a good-faith lawful factual predicate or for a retaliatory, protective, personal, electoral, partisan, or other improper case-specific purpose.

Covered misuse may include seeking investigation or prosecution of an opponent for an improper purpose; seeking protection, dismissal, leniency, or nonenforcement for an ally; obtaining confidential investigative information for personal or political use; manipulating staffing, jurisdiction, resources, or timing to obtain a desired result; directing materially false representations; or retaliating against resistance to such conduct.

Material expansion requires Special Division approval limited to connectedness and continuing necessity arising from the executive conflict. The panel shall not review investigative merits.

SEC. 9. POWERS AND DUTIES.

(a) Investigative authority.

Within jurisdiction, counsel may conduct grand-jury proceedings; seek subpoenas, warrants, immunity orders, and other lawful process; interview witnesses and subjects; litigate privilege, classification, immunity, and access disputes; preserve evidence; appoint and supervise staff; request agency assistance; and exercise authority necessary to complete the investigation.

(b) Other persons.

Counsel may initiate, decline, dismiss, negotiate, try, and appeal criminal cases against persons other than a sitting President when those persons fall within assigned jurisdiction.

(c) Sitting President.

Counsel may investigate a sitting President, collect and preserve evidence, use grand-jury process, investigate obstruction or retaliation, and transmit substantial and credible information to Congress. No officer, including the President or Attorney General, may terminate, limit, delay, or interfere because the subject is the sitting President.

A sitting President may not be indicted or tried under this Act while holding office. This prohibition does not prevent investigation, evidence preservation, lawful process appropriately tailored to official duties, reporting to Congress, or prosecution after the President leaves office if otherwise lawful.

(d) Immune official conduct.

Counsel may investigate conduct protected from criminal prosecution by presidential immunity when necessary to establish facts, preserve evidence, identify the acts of nonimmune participants, inform impeachment or legislative oversight, or recommend institutional safeguards. Counsel shall clearly distinguish factual findings from criminal conclusions and shall not characterize immunity itself as evidence of wrongdoing.

(e) DOJ rules and policies.

Counsel shall ordinarily comply with generally applicable DOJ rules and policies. Counsel may depart from a nonstatutory rule for specified good cause when compliance would impair independence, reflect the underlying conflict, frustrate the appointment, or be materially unsuitable. Counsel shall provide sealed written notice before departure or as soon afterward as practicable. Notice does not require approval; the Special Division may preserve it and consider knowing material abuse in removal proceedings but may not countermand the policy judgment.

SEC. 10. PERSONNEL, RECORDS, AND ASSISTANCE.

Counsel may employ sufficient independent personnel to avoid effective dependence on an agency controlled by a subject. Federal agencies shall provide reasonably necessary personnel, records, facilities, and technical assistance subject to lawful privilege and judicial process.

Detailed personnel may not be removed, reassigned, disciplined, denied access, or adversely treated because of lawful service. Access disputes shall receive expedited adjudication by an otherwise unassigned Article III judge. Classification alone does not authorize denial of access, though lawful security procedures remain applicable.

SEC. 11. INDEPENDENCE AND ANTI-EVASION.

No federal officer or employee may knowingly obstruct or materially impede counsel; conceal, destroy, alter, or withhold evidence; deny lawful assistance; retaliate against witnesses or personnel; or use classification, funding, reassignment, removal, privilege, or administrative control to frustrate the investigation.

Counsel shall notify the Special Division and appropriate congressional committees of substantial interference, subject to lawful delay protecting an active investigation, grand jury, national security, or individual rights.

SEC. 12. REMOVAL AND DISCIPLINE.

The President and executive officers may not remove, suspend, demote, reassign, or materially restrict counsel. A sealed removal petition may be filed by the Attorney General, DOJ Inspector General, Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, either Judiciary Committee by majority vote, or the Special Division based on substantial and credible information.

Removal requires incapacity, serious misconduct, knowing material jurisdictional violation, substantial dereliction, disqualifying conviction, knowing material abuse of policy-departure authority, or another condition incompatible with office integrity. Disagreement with investigative judgment, reporting, lawful prosecution of another person, or a good-faith policy departure is not cause.

Counsel shall receive notice, an opportunity to respond, and an evidentiary hearing where facts are disputed. Supreme Court review shall be expedited.

SEC. 13. FUNDING.

Protected appropriations shall be available in amounts reasonably necessary, subject to a statutory annual ceiling adjustable for inflation and Special Division approval of additional expenditures. Executive officers may not impound or condition funds. GAO shall audit expenditures without examining investigative merits. Judicial administration, counsel, investigative personnel, litigation, experts, security, records, and all other costs of this Act shall be payable under this section and separately accounted for.

SEC. 14. REPORTING AND IMPEACHMENT INFORMATION.

Counsel shall provide periodic administrative reports that protect grand-jury secrecy, classified information, fair-trial rights, and uncharged persons.

When substantial and credible information indicates presidential conduct potentially relevant to impeachment, counsel shall transmit a confidential report and supporting material to the House Judiciary Committee. The report shall distinguish judicial findings, possible criminal evidence, immune official conduct, evidence bearing on intent or abuse, conduct of other participants, and unresolved questions.

When an investigation reveals a serious institutional weakness without necessarily establishing criminal liability, counsel may transmit a confidential legislative-oversight report to the appropriate committees. Such a report may identify factual findings, legal constraints, recurring vulnerabilities, and recommended statutory or constitutional safeguards.

The House retains exclusive authority to determine whether impeachment is warranted. Appointment and investigation do not remove, suspend, disqualify, or alter tenure; do not authorize counsel or courts to decide impeachment; do not bypass or replace impeachment; and do not require Congress to await completion.

A supervising district court may authorize disclosure of grand-jury material to the House Judiciary Committee when legally permissible and necessary to its constitutional function.

At completion, counsel shall issue a report with a public version subject to lawful redaction and judicial resolution of disputes by a judge outside the Special Division.

SEC. 15. LIMITATIONS PERIODS.

For an offense within assigned jurisdiction allegedly committed by a sitting President, any otherwise applicable limitation period shall be suspended during presidential tenure and for 180 days thereafter, to the maximum extent permitted by the Constitution. Tolling preserves later accountability and does not authorize indictment or trial while the President remains in office.

SEC. 16. COMPLETION AND TERMINATION.

Counsel shall notify the Special Division when assigned matters are complete or lawfully transferred. The Division may terminate only when no substantial work remains, continued appointment is unnecessary to address the conflict, or no lawful jurisdiction remains. It may not terminate because it disagrees with pace, theory, investigative judgment, prosecution of another person, reporting, or policy departure.

Records shall be transferred to the National Archives under secure procedures preserving secrecy, classification, lawful congressional access, and future judicial process.

SEC. 17. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

Courts shall expedite actions concerning constitutionality, authority, access, removal, and enforcement. A mere subject or target may not ordinarily obtain interlocutory review before a judicially reviewable action. A criminal defendant retains all constitutional and statutory challenges in the resulting proceeding.

The appellate rules of this Act control. Supreme Court review of a final removal decision shall remain expedited as provided in section 12; review in a resulting criminal case shall proceed under otherwise applicable law.

SEC. 18. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this Act authorizes judicial prosecution; permits Congress or a court to direct a particular case; alters impeachment powers; establishes that unlawful or immune conduct is automatically criminal or impeachable; makes investigation a substitute for impeachment; prevents lawful executive appointment of other special counsel; diminishes defendants’ rights; authorizes unlawful disclosure; expands or abolishes substantive presidential immunity; or restricts the pardon power.

The central rule is that this Act protects investigation and reporting from presidential control; it does not authorize prosecution of a sitting President or decide the substantive scope of immunity.

SEC. 19. SEVERABILITY AND EFFECTIVE DATE.

Invalidity of one provision does not affect the remainder. The Act takes effect upon certification of ratification of the authorizing constitutional amendment and shall not impose retroactive substantive criminal liability.

Budgetary Impact Statement

Independent alternative.

Budget authority is likely required; no dollar estimate is assigned pending source-backed cost data. This Act must independently fund judicial administration, counsel, investigative staff, litigation, experts, security, records, and related operations.

Note: Preliminary ARRP assessment only; not a CBO, OMB, agency, or legislative-counsel score.

Drafting Notes

  • The statute separates protected investigation from prosecution of a sitting President.
  • It authorizes factual investigation and congressional reporting even where official-act immunity bars criminal prosecution.
  • Other persons may be prosecuted within jurisdiction.
  • Evidence preservation, House reporting, legislative oversight, and tolling prevent presidential tenure or immunity from making misconduct institutionally undiscoverable.
  • IMM-001 separately addresses substantive immunity.
  • The Special Division appoints and protects counsel but does not manage investigative or prosecutorial merits.
  • This bill is the independent DOJ-007 alternative. It neither invokes nor depends on the Interbranch Review Framework Act (JUD-011) and supplies its own judicial roster, Special Division, administration, funding, appointment, investigation, removal, reporting, and review authority.
  • The preferred DOJ-007 Shared-Framework Implementation Act uses the shared judicial infrastructure created by the Interbranch Review Framework Act (JUD-011) but is not required for this bill to operate.
  • Separate judges and decisional firewalls prevent a related civil proceeding from influencing appointment, investigation, removal, or a resulting criminal case.
  • A JUD-001 or JUD-005 notice can preserve and route an authenticated judicial finding, but DOJ-007 appointment still requires an authorized application, credible possible serious misconduct, extraordinary executive conflict, and independent panel findings.

Source Notes