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ELEC-011-state — Model State Algorithmic Redistricting Baseline and Public Deviation Act

A MODEL STATE BILL

To require a neutral algorithmic baseline map at the beginning of each redistricting cycle; to prohibit partisan, incumbent, candidate, donor, and election-performance data from the baseline process; to require public findings for any departure from the baseline; to preserve lawful representation safeguards; to provide legislative approval and judicial fallback procedures; and for other purposes.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Algorithmic Redistricting Baseline and Public Deviation Act.”

SEC. 2. PURPOSES.

The purposes of this Act are to—

  1. reduce partisan, incumbent-protection, and factional manipulation of district lines;
  2. require a neutral first-draft map before discretionary map changes are considered;
  3. preserve lawful protections for equal population, contiguity, compactness, minority voting opportunity, tribal integrity, municipal integrity, and compact communities of interest;
  4. make every departure from the neutral baseline public, written, criterion-specific, and reviewable;
  5. preserve legislative responsibility for adopting district plans while preventing unexplained substitute maps;
  6. prohibit use of partisan, incumbent, candidate, donor, campaign, or election-performance data in the baseline map;
  7. deter mid-decade redistricting for political advantage; and
  8. improve public confidence that districts are drawn from neutral rules rather than private political bargaining.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

  1. Algorithmic baseline map means the first redistricting plan generated under section 5 by applying the approved redistricting algorithm to authorized input data before any discretionary human departure.
  2. Approved redistricting algorithm means the public, deterministic, replicable method adopted under section 4 to generate an algorithmic baseline map.
  3. Authorized input data means population data, census geography, precinct geography where needed for administrability, contiguity data, state boundary data, political-subdivision boundary data, tribal boundary data where lawfully available, water and geographic-feature data, and other nonpartisan data expressly authorized by this Act or by rule adopted under this Act.
  4. Prohibited political data means data concerning political party affiliation, voter registration by party, prior election results, partisan performance, candidate residence, incumbent residence, campaign contributions, donor identity, campaign activity, candidate endorsements, demographic proxies selected for partisan effect, or any comparable data whose principal use in redistricting is partisan, incumbent-protective, or factional advantage.
  5. Covered district plan means a congressional, state legislative, or other district plan required to be redrawn after a federal decennial census or other lawful redistricting trigger.
  6. Departing plan means any proposed district plan that differs from the algorithmic baseline map.
  7. Deviation means any material change from the algorithmic baseline map, including alteration of a district boundary, exchange of population between districts, division or consolidation of a political subdivision or compact community, or change in district configuration.
  8. Permissible deviation criterion means a criterion listed in section 7.
  9. Review body means the nonpartisan office, independent commission, redistricting commission, or other state body designated under section 4 to review the algorithmic baseline map and any departing plan.
  10. Material objection means a public comment, expert submission, local-government submission, tribal-government submission, community submission, or party submission that identifies a specific legal, factual, representational, geographic, or administrability issue with the algorithmic baseline map or a departing plan.

SEC. 4. DESIGNATION OF REDISTRICTING AUTHORITY AND ALGORITHM.

(a) Designation.

The State shall designate by law a review body to administer the baseline process required by this Act. The review body may be an existing nonpartisan legislative service office, an independent redistricting commission, a state election office, a court-appointed special master, or another body that satisfies subsection (b).

(b) Required independence safeguards.

The review body shall operate under written safeguards that—

  1. prohibit the use of prohibited political data except as expressly permitted in section 8;
  2. require public disclosure of algorithm specifications, input data, code, parameter settings, and map outputs;
  3. prohibit private communications concerning map design except as disclosed in the public record;
  4. require staff and contractors to certify compliance with this Act;
  5. require preservation of all draft maps, code versions, data files, comments, findings, and communications required to be public under this Act; and
  6. require recusal from baseline generation or deviation review for a person with a current campaign, candidate, party, lobbying, paid map-consulting, or incumbent-protection conflict defined by rule.

(c) Algorithm adoption.

Not later than one year before the next ordinary redistricting cycle, the review body shall adopt an approved redistricting algorithm by public rule or public order.

The approved redistricting algorithm shall—

  1. be deterministic and replicable from public inputs;
  2. prioritize equal population and contiguity;
  3. use compactness and boundary-respect measures defined in advance;
  4. avoid use of prohibited political data;
  5. identify how ties or equivalent map outputs are resolved;
  6. generate a complete baseline plan for each covered district plan;
  7. produce machine-readable and human-readable outputs; and
  8. be capable of independent replication by a court, expert, candidate, civic organization, local government, tribal government, or member of the public using public data.

(d) Algorithm selection standards.

The State may use shortest splitline, modified shortest splitline, or another neutral deterministic method if the method satisfies subsection (c). The State shall not select an algorithm because it predictably advantages or disadvantages a party, candidate, incumbent, faction, racial group, language-minority group, region, or community.

SEC. 5. ALGORITHMIC BASELINE MAP.

(a) Baseline required.

For each redistricting cycle and each covered district plan, the review body shall generate and publish an algorithmic baseline map before the legislature, commission, court, or other adopting authority considers any departing plan.

(b) Publication.

The review body shall publish—

  1. the algorithmic baseline map;
  2. the approved redistricting algorithm;
  3. source code or a complete technical specification sufficient for independent replication;
  4. authorized input data;
  5. parameter settings;
  6. population totals and deviations for each district;
  7. compactness and boundary-respect measures;
  8. a plain-language explanation of the algorithm; and
  9. instructions for submitting public comments and proposed corrections.

The review body shall conduct an initial legal and administrability review of the algorithmic baseline map and identify any apparent issue concerning equal population, contiguity, federal law, state constitutional law, Voting Rights Act compliance, tribal integrity, political-subdivision integrity, compact communities of interest, geographic barriers, election administration, or other permissible deviation criterion.

(d) No final adoption by silence.

The algorithmic baseline map shall not become the enacted district plan by mere publication unless state law separately provides for automatic adoption after completion of the public process required by this Act.

SEC. 6. PROHIBITED DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) Baseline map prohibition.

The review body, staff, contractors, consultants, and any person generating the algorithmic baseline map may not use prohibited political data to generate, tune, select, reject, or modify the algorithmic baseline map.

(b) Departing plan disclosure.

If a person submits or sponsors a departing plan and has used any data described in the definition of prohibited political data, the person shall disclose the data categories used and the reason each category was used. Disclosure under this subsection does not make the data use lawful if otherwise prohibited.

(c) Private map design communications.

A communication concerning district configuration, baseline-map alteration, or a departing plan between the review body and a legislator, legislative staff member, party officer, candidate, incumbent, campaign, donor, lobbyist, consultant, or outside organization shall be placed in the public record unless protected by a court order or by a specific privilege recognized by state law.

SEC. 7. PERMISSIBLE DEVIATIONS FROM BASELINE.

(a) Written findings required.

A departing plan may be considered only if each material deviation from the algorithmic baseline map is supported by written findings identifying the specific permissible deviation criterion, the facts supporting the deviation, the data used, the population affected, and why no narrower deviation is adequate.

(b) Permissible deviation criteria.

A deviation from the algorithmic baseline map may be justified only to—

  1. comply with the United States Constitution;
  2. comply with the State Constitution;
  3. comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 or another applicable federal voting-rights law;
  4. comply with a state voting-rights act consistent with this Act and other controlling law;
  5. maintain contiguity;
  6. reduce avoidable population deviation;
  7. preserve a federally recognized tribal community or reservation where lawful and administratively feasible;
  8. preserve a municipality, county, precinct, or other political subdivision where lawful and administratively feasible;
  9. preserve a compact community of interest supported by public evidence;
  10. address a significant geographic barrier or transportation discontinuity;
  11. correct a data error, topology error, census-geography error, or algorithmic implementation error;
  12. improve election-administration feasibility without using prohibited political data; or
  13. comply with a final court order.

(c) Narrow tailoring.

Each deviation shall be no broader than reasonably necessary to satisfy the identified permissible deviation criterion.

(d) State-law limitation.

A state voting-rights act may justify a deviation only if the law protects equal political opportunity or lawful representation safeguards and does not authorize a departure broader than necessary to remedy the identified legal or representational injury.

(e) Prohibited justifications.

A deviation may not be justified by incumbent protection, candidate protection, partisan advantage, donor preference, campaign strategy, retaliation against voters, dilution of a disfavored community, or a desire to avoid lawful electoral competition.

(f) Burden of explanation.

The sponsor of a departing plan bears the burden of producing the written findings required by this section. The review body shall determine whether the findings are complete before the departing plan may proceed to legislative consideration.

SEC. 8. REPRESENTATION-SAFEGUARD REVIEW.

(a) Required review.

Before final adoption of a covered district plan, the review body shall evaluate whether the algorithmic baseline map or a departing plan unlawfully dilutes voting strength, violates federal or state voting-rights law, subordinates traditional districting principles without legal necessity, or creates a legally impermissible racial gerrymander.

(b) Limited use of sensitive representation data.

Race, ethnicity, language-minority, tribal, citizenship-age population, voting-age population, and comparable representation data may be used only for the review and lawful correction of issues identified in subsection (a), not for partisan, incumbent-protection, or factional advantage.

(c) Public explanation.

Where a map uses representation data to support a deviation, the review body shall publish findings explaining the legal basis, factual basis, affected districts, alternative maps considered, and reasons the deviation is narrowly tailored.

(d) No quota or entitlement.

Nothing in this Act authorizes a quota, racial target, partisan target, or predetermined electoral outcome. The Act preserves lawful representation safeguards while requiring neutral, public, and reviewable justification.

SEC. 9. PUBLIC COMMENT AND RESPONSE.

(a) Comment period.

The review body shall provide a public comment period of not less than 30 days after publication of the algorithmic baseline map and not less than 14 days after publication of any materially departing plan, unless a court finds that an emergency deadline requires a shorter period.

(b) Hearings.

The review body shall hold public hearings accessible to residents in different regions of the State and shall provide remote participation to the greatest practicable extent.

(c) Response to material objections.

Before final legislative consideration, the review body shall publish a response to material objections. The response shall state whether the objection is accepted, rejected, or resolved by modification and shall identify the supporting facts and legal criteria.

(d) Public archive.

The State shall maintain a public archive containing the algorithm, data, baseline map, departing plans, written findings, public comments, responses to material objections, hearing materials, final enacted plan, and any judicial order relating to the plan.

SEC. 10. LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATION.

(a) Baseline-first rule.

The legislature may not consider or enact a covered district plan until the algorithmic baseline map and the review body's written findings have been published as required by this Act.

(b) Up-or-down procedure authorized.

The State may provide by law that the legislature shall vote first on the algorithmic baseline map or on a review-body recommended plan without amendment.

(c) Constrained amendments.

If legislative amendments are permitted, each amendment shall be accompanied by written findings satisfying section 7 and shall be published before final passage unless a court finds that an emergency deadline requires shorter notice.

(d) Explanation of rejection.

If the legislature rejects the algorithmic baseline map or a review-body recommended plan, the rejecting chamber shall publish a written statement identifying the statutory criteria or legal defects that justify rejection.

(e) No secret substitute map.

The legislature may not enact a covered district plan that has not been published, reviewed, and subjected to public comment under this Act, except pursuant to a final court order.

SEC. 11. JUDICIAL FALLBACK.

(a) Trigger.

Judicial fallback is available if—

  1. the legislature fails to enact a covered district plan by the statutory deadline;
  2. the legislature rejects two plans that the review body has found compliant;
  3. the legislature enacts a plan without the findings, publication, comment, or review required by this Act;
  4. a court invalidates an enacted plan and no timely lawful replacement is enacted; or
  5. a court finds that the redistricting process has been materially corrupted by prohibited data use, undisclosed map design communications, or bad-faith evasion of this Act.

(b) Court authority.

Upon a fallback trigger, the court may adopt the algorithmic baseline map, adopt a review-body recommended plan, appoint a special master, order limited corrections, set an expedited schedule, or provide other relief necessary to implement a lawful district plan.

(c) Preference.

In selecting a remedial plan, the court shall give preference to the algorithmic baseline map or the least-departing lawful plan unless the court finds that a greater departure is necessary to comply with federal or state law.

SEC. 12. MID-DECADE REDISTRICTING LIMIT.

(a) General rule.

After a covered district plan is enacted following a federal decennial census, the State may not enact a replacement plan before the next federal decennial census except as provided in subsection (b).

(b) Exceptions.

Mid-decade redistricting is permitted only—

  1. to comply with a final court order;
  2. to correct a legally material census, boundary, or data error;
  3. to comply with federal law or state constitutional law;
  4. to implement a newly enacted state constitutional redistricting requirement; or
  5. to remedy a plan held invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction.

(c) No partisan-purpose exception.

Partisan advantage, incumbent protection, change in legislative control, change in executive control, or dissatisfaction with the prior plan is not a lawful basis for mid-decade redistricting.

SEC. 13. PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AND EXPEDITED REVIEW.

(a) Action authorized.

A voter, candidate, political subdivision, tribal government, community organization, or other person authorized by state law may bring an action to enforce this Act.

(b) Relief.

A court may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief, remand to the review body, invalidation of an unlawful departing plan, adoption of a fallback plan, costs, reasonable attorney's fees where authorized by state law, and other appropriate relief.

(c) Expedited review.

A court shall expedite any action under this Act to the greatest practicable extent, especially where delay may affect candidate filing, ballot preparation, primary elections, general elections, or representation during an election cycle.

SEC. 14. RELATION TO OTHER LAW.

This Act supplements and does not diminish any protection provided by the United States Constitution, the State Constitution, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a state voting-rights act, state redistricting criteria, state open-meetings law, state public-records law, or another law governing districting.

Where another law requires greater transparency, broader public participation, stricter anti-gerrymandering protection, or stronger minority-vote protection, the more protective provision controls to the extent consistent with federal law.

SEC. 15. RULEMAKING.

The review body may adopt rules necessary to implement this Act, including rules governing algorithm selection, technical standards, data publication, conflict certification, public-comment procedure, hearing access, archive format, written findings, emergency deadlines, and preservation of records.

Rules adopted under this section may not authorize use of prohibited political data in the algorithmic baseline map or expand permissible deviation criteria beyond those stated in section 7.

Rules adopted under this section may not construe a state voting-rights act, state redistricting criterion, or state procedural rule to nullify the algorithmic baseline process or authorize a deviation broader than necessary to remedy the identified legal or representational injury.

SEC. 16. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this Act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act and the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected.

SEC. 17. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Act takes effect on [date] and applies to the first redistricting cycle beginning after that date. If enacted during an active redistricting cycle, the court or review body may adjust deadlines to preserve compliance with federal and state election deadlines while implementing the purposes of this Act to the greatest practicable extent.

Budgetary Impact Statement

Budget authority may be required for algorithm development, public data publication, hearings, review-body staffing, technical contractors, archival systems, and litigation; no dollar estimate is assigned pending source-backed cost data.

Note: Preliminary ARRP assessment only; not a CBO, OMB, agency, or legislative-counsel score.

Drafting Notes

  • This is a model state act and should be adapted to each State's constitution, redistricting commission structure, legislative procedure, public-records law, open-meetings law, judicial-review rules, and election calendar.
  • A State-specific draft should identify the redistricting authority or review body, algorithm-certification method, state court jurisdiction and standing, public-records and open-meetings cross-references, election-calendar deadlines, funding source, and whether a statute alone is durable or a state constitutional amendment is needed to prevent later bypass.
  • The Act makes the algorithmic map the required first draft rather than the final enacted map.
  • The Act prohibits partisan, incumbent, candidate, donor, campaign, and election-performance data in the baseline-generation process.
  • The Act permits public and reviewable departures where needed for federal law, state constitutional law, Voting Rights Act compliance, state voting-rights acts, tribal integrity, political-subdivision integrity, compact communities of interest, geography, contiguity, equal population, or administrability.
  • State voting-rights acts are treated as protective safeguards, not as authority to bypass the neutral baseline or justify broader-than-necessary departures.
  • The Act includes judicial fallback to prevent repeated rejection of compliant maps or enactment of undisclosed substitute maps.
  • The Act does not draft the reserve constitutional amendment referenced on the issue page.
  • California Constitution Article XXI is a useful state constitutional analogue for an independent commission, open process, ordered criteria, Voting Rights Act compliance, community-of-interest protection, incumbent/candidate/party neutrality limits, final-map reporting, state supreme court review, special-master fallback, and funding/defense provisions.
  • The current California Article XXI text is also a durability caution because it includes a 2025 temporary congressional-map override. A State-specific ELEC-011 package should decide whether anti-mid-cycle safeguards belong in ordinary statute, a state constitutional amendment, or both.
  • The California Citizens Redistricting Commission's 2020 lessons-learned report supplies a workload and fiscal analogue for State-specific drafting. A State package should budget for outreach, data management, mapping software or specifications, technical contractors, legal counsel, public-input processing, financial reporting, and post-map litigation capacity.
  • The internal project review added technical source leads for simulation workflows, public code/data, and adversarial community-of-interest input, but those sources do not select the statutory algorithm. A State-specific draft still needs an algorithm-certification appendix or rulemaking package before publication-ready use.

Source Notes

  • Iowa Code chapter 42 is the closest verified state-law analogue for nonpartisan plan preparation, up-or-down legislative consideration, compactness/contiguity/political-subdivision standards, political-data limits, and public map disclosures.
  • California Elections Code sections 14025-14032, New York Election Law section 17-206, and Washington chapter 29A.92 RCW are state voting-rights-law comparators for protective-floor and remedy language; they do not eliminate the need for State-specific constitutional and statutory adaptation.
  • Rucho v. Common Cause supports state-law and congressional reform pathways after federal partisan-gerrymandering nonjusticiability.
  • Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission supports state-law use of independent redistricting institutions for congressional redistricting.
  • Allen v. Milligan and Louisiana v. Callais are caution sources for Voting Rights Act and racial-gerrymandering tailoring.
  • Algorithmic redistricting sources remain technical leads rather than final legal validation for a particular algorithm.
  • The issue-page source record now includes Iowa statutory mechanics and Constitution Annotated sources verified during internal project review, state voting-rights-law comparators, core Supreme Court doctrine sources, algorithmic source leads, and California Constitution Article XXI as a state constitutional comparator.
  • The internal project review added the California Citizens Redistricting Commission's 2020 lessons-learned report as a workload, public-input, finance, data-management, and litigation-budget analogue, and California's 2008 Statement of Vote as an adoption analogue for state redistricting reform.
  • State constitutional redistricting provisions, commission structures, public-records/open-meetings fit, state-specific costs, and final algorithm-selection standards still need qualified external review before treating this model act as publication-ready.