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ELEC-003-state — Model State Election Personnel Protection and Continuity Act

A MODEL STATE BILL

To protect election personnel and their families from threats, violence, coercive intimidation, unlawful disclosure of personal information, retaliation, and operational disruption; to provide rapid protective and continuity measures; to preserve constitutionally protected speech; and to establish a politically neutral state protection regime eligible for federal support under a corresponding amendment to the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Election Personnel Protection and Continuity Act.”

SEC. 2. PURPOSES.

The purposes of this Act are to—

  1. reduce the likelihood that election personnel or their families will be threatened, attacked, displaced, harassed, doxxed, or retaliated against because of election duties;
  2. provide protection before harm occurs rather than relying exclusively on punishment afterward;
  3. preserve continuity of polling, tabulation, canvassing, recount, certification, records, and related election operations during a threat or disruption;
  4. retain experienced election personnel and reduce threat-driven resignation and recruitment loss;
  5. apply protection without regard to political affiliation, candidate preference, viewpoint, election outcome, or the perceived political effect of an official act; and
  6. preserve lawful criticism, protest, advocacy, reporting, and other speech protected by the United States and State Constitutions.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

  1. Covered election personnel means a current, former, prospective, or temporary state or local election official, employee, poll worker, canvasser, contractor, vendor employee, volunteer, or other person performing an authorized election function.
  2. Covered family or household member means a spouse, domestic partner, child, parent, sibling, dependent, household member, or other person targeted because of the election duties of covered election personnel.
  3. Election function includes voter registration, ballot preparation, polling-place operation, ballot custody, counting, tabulation, auditing, recounting, canvassing, certification, records administration, equipment support, election-security support, and adjudicative or ministerial duties assigned by law.
  4. Protected personal information means a residential address, personal telephone number, personal email address, Social Security number, financial-account information, precise geolocation, school or childcare location, family-member identity, vehicle information, or other information designated by rule because disclosure creates a material safety risk.
  5. Targeted harassment means a course of conduct directed at a covered person because of an election function that would cause a reasonable person substantial fear, substantial emotional distress, or material interference with employment or public service, and that is not constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity.
  6. Coercive intimidation means conduct undertaken with the purpose of causing a covered person, through fear of injury, unlawful exposure, economic retaliation, or harm to another, to perform, refrain from performing, alter, delay, or abandon a lawful election duty.
  7. Credible threat means information that, under the totality of circumstances, provides a reasonable basis to believe that violence, unlawful entry, stalking, targeted harassment, doxxing, retaliation, or material operational disruption may occur.
  8. Protection coordinator means the existing state officer or office designated under section 5. No new agency is created by this Act.

SEC. 4. POLITICALLY NEUTRAL AND UNIFORM PROTECTION.

Protection, assessment, assistance, enforcement, and remedies under this Act shall be provided without regard to—

  1. political party or affiliation;
  2. candidate preference or ideological viewpoint;
  3. the identity of the person making an allegation;
  4. the identity of the person allegedly responsible;
  5. whether the protected person’s lawful conduct benefited or burdened a candidate, party, ballot measure, or electoral outcome; or
  6. whether the protected person certified, declined to certify pending lawful review, referred a matter for investigation, testified, or otherwise performed a lawful election duty.

Risk-based distinctions may be made only on neutral factors including credibility, imminence, severity, capability, vulnerability, prior conduct, location, and likely operational impact.

SEC. 5. DESIGNATION OF EXISTING STATE RESPONSIBILITY.

The Governor shall designate an existing state office, which may include the office of the attorney general, chief state election official, state police, or emergency-management agency, to serve as protection coordinator.

The protection coordinator shall—

  1. maintain a single statewide reporting channel available at all times during designated election periods;
  2. coordinate election officials, law enforcement, prosecutors, courts, emergency management, and local government;
  3. establish written triage and referral protocols;
  4. arrange emergency protection and continuity support authorized by this Act;
  5. maintain aggregate records sufficient for oversight while protecting personal and security-sensitive information; and
  6. distribute state and federal funds to local jurisdictions according to objective need and risk criteria.

The protection coordinator has no authority under this Act to direct or alter voter eligibility, registration, voting methods, ballot access, counting, canvassing, recounts, certification, elector appointment, or adjudication of an election dispute.

SEC. 6. RAPID REPORTING, ASSESSMENT, AND RESPONSE.

A covered person, election office, law-enforcement agency, or household member may report a threat or covered incident through the statewide channel.

Upon receipt of a report indicating a credible threat, the protection coordinator shall ensure that—

  1. an initial safety assessment begins promptly and, when practicable, within two hours;
  2. an imminent threat is referred immediately to emergency law enforcement;
  3. protected personal information is reviewed for exposure and removal or suppression options;
  4. affected family or household members are included in the assessment;
  5. the relevant election office receives continuity guidance without disclosure of unnecessary personal information; and
  6. the reporting person receives a case identifier and a point of contact.

A report may not be rejected solely because the communication does not yet satisfy every element of a criminal offense.

SEC. 7. EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

Upon a finding of a credible threat, the protection coordinator may authorize, directly or through an existing state or local agency—

  1. temporary residential or workplace security;
  2. law-enforcement patrol or escort;
  3. security-system installation or reimbursement;
  4. temporary relocation, lodging, transportation, or dependent-care assistance;
  5. replacement of compromised communication devices or accounts;
  6. safety planning for family or household members;
  7. emergency legal assistance for protective orders, records suppression, or related proceedings;
  8. trauma-informed counseling and employee assistance; and
  9. other narrowly tailored measures reasonably necessary to reduce an identified risk.

Assistance shall be based on risk and need, not rank, publicity, party affiliation, or election outcome.

SEC. 8. EXPEDITED PROTECTIVE ORDERS.

A covered person, covered family or household member, protection coordinator, attorney general, or prosecutor may petition a court for an election-personnel protective order upon a showing of a credible threat, stalking, unlawful disclosure of protected personal information, coercive intimidation, targeted harassment, or retaliation connected to an election function.

The court may—

  1. issue temporary ex parte relief when immediate and irreparable injury is likely;
  2. prohibit contact, surveillance, stalking, unlawful disclosure, or approach to a residence, workplace, polling place, tabulation center, or other protected location;
  3. order removal of unlawfully posted protected personal information where consistent with constitutional requirements;
  4. protect family or household members exposed through the same conduct; and
  5. order other narrowly tailored relief necessary to prevent recurrence.

A prompt adversarial hearing and all procedural protections required by state and federal law shall be provided.

SEC. 9. ADDRESS CONFIDENTIALITY AND DATA MINIMIZATION.

A covered person facing a credible threat may enroll in an existing address-confidentiality program or, if none applies, in a program administered by an existing state office.

State and local agencies shall, to the maximum extent permitted by law—

  1. substitute a designated service address for a residential address in public records;
  2. redact protected personal information before public release;
  3. restrict internal access to personnel with a demonstrated operational need;
  4. avoid collecting or retaining protected personal information not necessary to an election function; and
  5. establish an expedited process for correcting or suppressing accidental disclosure.

This section does not authorize concealment of information that is constitutionally required to be public, but requires use of the least personally exposing lawful alternative.

SEC. 10. UNLAWFUL DISCLOSURE OF PROTECTED PERSONAL INFORMATION.

A person is civilly liable if the person knowingly and without lawful purpose publicly discloses protected personal information of covered election personnel or a covered family or household member—

  1. because of the person’s election function;
  2. with intent to threaten, intimidate, facilitate unlawful contact, or cause material fear or disruption; or
  3. with reckless disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the disclosure will facilitate violence, stalking, unlawful entry, or targeted harassment.

Available relief may include actual damages, statutory damages, injunctive relief, reasonable attorney’s fees, costs of security or relocation, and other appropriate relief.

This section does not apply to protected newsgathering, reporting on a matter of public concern, lawful service of process, good-faith disclosure to law enforcement, or other constitutionally protected activity.

SEC. 11. THREATS, COERCIVE INTIMIDATION, AND RETALIATION.

A person commits an offense if the person, because of a covered person’s election function—

  1. communicates a true threat of violence while consciously disregarding a substantial risk that the communication will be understood as threatening violence;
  2. uses force, threatened force, stalking, or coercive intimidation to influence, punish, delay, or prevent performance of a lawful election duty;
  3. threatens or harms a covered family or household member for that purpose;
  4. knowingly retaliates through unlawful employment, contracting, licensing, property, or economic action; or
  5. conspires with another person to commit conduct described in this section.

Penalty levels shall be calibrated to comparable state offenses and enhanced where conduct involves a weapon, explosive device, repeated targeting, family targeting, substantial bodily injury, or material disruption of an election function.

This section shall be construed consistently with Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023), and shall not criminalize protected criticism, advocacy, protest, parody, rhetorical hyperbole, or other speech protected by the First Amendment.

SEC. 12. FALSE REPORTS, BOMB THREATS, SWATTING, AND FACILITY DISRUPTION.

A person commits an aggravated offense if the person knowingly makes or causes a false report of a bomb, hazardous substance, armed attack, hostage event, or other emergency concerning—

  1. a polling place;
  2. an election office;
  3. a ballot-storage, counting, tabulation, audit, recount, canvassing, or certification facility;
  4. the residence or workplace of covered election personnel; or
  5. another location with intent to disrupt an election function or cause an armed emergency response against a covered person.

In addition to other penalties, a court may order restitution for emergency response, evacuation, replacement polling operations, extended operating hours, security measures, and other direct public costs.

SEC. 13. CONTINUITY OF ELECTION OPERATIONS.

Each state and local election authority shall maintain a continuity plan proportionate to its size and risk. The plan shall address—

  1. evacuation and relocation of polling, counting, tabulation, canvassing, recount, and certification functions;
  2. backup facilities, communications, equipment, records, and staffing;
  3. emergency succession and delegation of duties;
  4. preservation and secure transfer of ballots and election records;
  5. rapid public notice of a temporary closure or relocation;
  6. lawful extension of hours or other remedial action when authorized by state law or court order;
  7. protection of workers and voters during a threat; and
  8. after-action review without public disclosure of exploitable security vulnerabilities.

The chief state election official shall establish model continuity templates but may not use this section to control local election policy beyond the requirements stated here.

SEC. 14. WORKFORCE RETENTION AND SUPPORT.

The state shall permit protection funds to be used for—

  1. training on threat recognition, reporting, de-escalation, digital privacy, and records protection;
  2. counseling and trauma support;
  3. temporary staffing and replacement personnel following a threat or evacuation;
  4. reasonable security-related leave and accommodations;
  5. recruitment and retention measures in jurisdictions experiencing documented threat-related attrition; and
  6. reimbursement of necessary out-of-pocket security costs.

An election worker may not be disciplined, demoted, or dismissed for making a good-faith report, seeking protection, participating in an investigation, or refusing an unlawful directive.

SEC. 15. CIVIL ACTION AND EQUITABLE RELIEF.

A covered person or covered family or household member injured by a violation of sections 10, 11, 12, or 14 may bring a civil action for appropriate relief, including damages, injunctive relief, security and relocation costs, attorney’s fees, and costs.

A court shall prioritize a request for emergency relief where delay would materially increase personal danger or threaten continuity of an election function.

This section does not create liability for a government employee’s good-faith exercise of protected prosecutorial, judicial, or emergency-response discretion.

SEC. 16. AGGREGATE REPORTING AND OVERSIGHT.

The protection coordinator shall publish an annual aggregate report stating—

  1. the number and general category of reports received;
  2. response times and dispositions;
  3. forms of assistance provided;
  4. funds distributed and expended;
  5. operational disruptions and continuity measures used;
  6. workforce effects reasonably attributable to threats or harassment;
  7. federal amounts received, obligated, expended, unobligated, and carried forward; and
  8. any automatic federal payment reduction resulting from an unobligated-balance threshold.

The report may not identify a protected person, disclose a residential address, reveal an active investigative fact, expose a security vulnerability, or disclose information reasonably likely to facilitate further targeting.

SEC. 17. FUNDING, MATCHING, CARRYOVER, AND LOCAL DISTRIBUTION.

The legislature shall appropriate funds sufficient to administer this Act. Federal funds received for election-personnel protection may be used only for purposes authorized by this Act and the governing federal statute.

The State and any political subdivision may voluntarily appropriate, match, supplement, or expend non-Federal funds for purposes consistent with this Act. No State or local matching contribution is required as a condition of eligibility for federal funds unless separately enacted by the State.

Federal funds received under the corresponding federal election-personnel protection program shall be held in a State election-personnel protection fund or separately accounted subaccount of an existing State election fund. Interest earned on federal amounts shall be credited to that fund or subaccount and used only for purposes authorized by this Act and the governing federal statute.

Unobligated federal balances may be carried forward into succeeding fiscal years while this Act, or substitute provisions satisfying the federal minimum requirements, remains in force. Future federal payments may be reduced pursuant to the nondiscretionary balance-adjustment formula established by federal law if the State’s unobligated federal balance exceeds the federal reserve threshold.

Funds distributed to local jurisdictions shall be allocated under objective criteria that consider population, number of election facilities, documented risk, resource capacity, and demonstrated security need. Political affiliation, election outcome, and disagreement with state or local election policy may not be considered.

Acceptance of federal funds does not authorize a federal officer or entity to supervise or influence any election law, policy, procedure, decision, or dispute beyond verifying eligibility and lawful expenditure under the governing federal statute.

SEC. 18. FEDERAL ELIGIBILITY CERTIFICATION AND CONTINUING MAINTENANCE.

This Act is intended to constitute a qualifying State law for purposes of the Election Personnel Protection Payments title of the Help America Vote Act of 2002, as amended.

The chief state election official and the attorney general, or equivalent state legal officer, shall jointly prepare and submit any certification, citation table, statutory crosswalk, expenditure certification, unobligated-balance report, reserve-threshold calculation, or related fiscal report required to establish or maintain eligibility for federal election-personnel protection payments.

The State shall maintain the protections required by this Act as a condition of future eligibility for such payments. Repeal or material narrowing of this Act terminates eligibility for future federal payments unless the State enacts substitute provisions satisfying the federal minimum requirements.

Nothing in this section incorporates future federal guidance, regulation, policy statement, executive order, model practice, or administrative condition into state law. Eligibility shall be determined only by the federal statute enacted by Congress and the state statutory provisions in force.

SEC. 19. RELATION TO OTHER LAW.

This Act supplements and does not narrow any other criminal offense, civil remedy, public-employment protection, address-confidentiality provision, victims’ right, emergency authority, or election-continuity procedure.

Where another law provides greater protection consistent with constitutional requirements, the greater protection controls.

SEC. 20. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision or application of this Act is held invalid, the remainder shall not be affected.

Budgetary Impact Statement

Budget authority is likely required; no dollar estimate is assigned pending source-backed cost data.

Note: Preliminary ARRP assessment only; not a CBO, OMB, agency, or legislative-counsel score.

Drafting Notes

  • The Act intentionally uses existing state institutions rather than creating a new election-security agency.
  • Criminal threat provisions must require at least recklessness as to the threatening character of the communication under Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023).
  • Doxxing provisions are limited by intent, recklessness, causation, exceptions, and tailored remedies to reduce First Amendment and overbreadth risk.
  • The model distinguishes personal protection from election administration: the protection coordinator may secure people and operations but may not direct election outcomes or procedures beyond continuity requirements stated by law.
  • States should conform protective-order procedure, offense grading, public-record exemptions, labor protections, standing, and appropriations to their constitutions and existing codes.
  • The federal eligibility crosswalk is mandatory for future revision: no federal minimum condition should be added or revised without identifying the corresponding state-law provision.
  • The manifestation-to-remedy crosswalk is mandatory for future revision: no documented manifestation should remain without a corresponding preventive, protective, continuity, remedial, or workforce mechanism.

Source Notes

  • Manifestation support is developed in the ELEC-003 framework analysis, including source links for Freeman and Moss, Arizona election-official threats, 2024 Election Day bomb threats, Raffensperger family-directed threats, and election-workforce attrition.
  • Threat-offense review should include Counterman v. Colorado.