ELEC-004-state — Model State Election Proceedings Integrity Act

A MODEL STATE BILL

To establish an Anti-SLAPP-style special screening mechanism for election proceedings, civil subpoenas, noncriminal audits, noncriminal investigation demands, and inspection demands; to preserve good-faith election challenges; to prevent legal process from being used to delay certification, manufacture uncertainty, harass election personnel, obtain unauthorized access to sensitive election materials, or create a false predicate for extra-legal pressure; and for other purposes.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Election Proceedings Integrity Act.”

SEC. 2. PURPOSES.

(a) Anti-SLAPP-style adaptation.

This Act adapts the procedural logic of Anti-SLAPP laws to state election proceedings. Anti-SLAPP laws recognize that legal process can itself be used abusively to impose cost, delay, discovery burdens, reputational harm, or coercive pressure before a court or tribunal reaches the merits. This Act applies that logic to election litigation, civil subpoenas, noncriminal audits, noncriminal investigation demands, and inspection demands that seek election-disruptive relief or access to sensitive election material without an early particularized showing.

(b) Purposes.

The purposes of this Act are to preserve access to lawful recounts, contests, noncriminal audits, noncriminal investigation demands, and judicial review; distinguish ordinary citizen reporting from coercive or disruptive election proceedings; require early particularized showings before a proceeding may delay certification, alter results, compel nonstatutory audits, burden election personnel, or access sensitive election materials; protect ballots, voter privacy, voting systems, chain of custody, and election-security information; reduce abuse of civil subpoenas, discovery, noncriminal audits, noncriminal investigation demands, and public-law proceedings; and provide sanctions where later-discovered evidence proves that a proceeding was materially connected to a coordinated improper scheme.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

1. Covered election proceeding means a civil action, election contest, petition, motion, civil subpoena, discovery demand, inspection demand, audit demand, noncriminal investigation demand, legislative demand, administrative demand, or request for emergency relief filed, issued, or pursued in relation to an election if the proceeding seeks or would foreseeably cause election-disruptive relief.
2. Election-disruptive relief means relief or action that would delay, enjoin, alter, decertify, nullify, or otherwise disturb voter eligibility lists, ballot preparation, voting procedures, counting, tabulation, auditing, recounting, canvassing, certification, appointment of presidential electors, transmission of election returns, or another statutory election deadline.
3. Sensitive election material means ballots, ballot images, voter-identifiable data, election-management-system data, voting-system source code, tabulator or scanner data, security logs, chain-of-custody records, passwords, keys, security procedures, facility plans, or other election material whose disclosure, inspection, copying, or transfer may impair ballot secrecy, voter privacy, election security, or chain of custody.
4. Special screening motion means a motion under section 5 to dismiss, narrow, stay, condition, or otherwise control a covered election proceeding.
5. Improper purpose includes delay, harassment, knowingly false factual presentation, reckless disregard of contrary evidence, unauthorized access to sensitive election material, creation of a false predicate for disrupting certification or elector appointment, or other bad-faith use of legal, noncriminal investigative, administrative, legislative, or judicial process.
6. Good-faith report means a report of suspected election irregularity made to an election official, law-enforcement agency, prosecutor, candidate, political party, court, or other body authorized by law to receive such information, where the report does not itself seek election-disruptive relief or access to sensitive election material.

SEC. 4. SCOPE; PRESERVED ACTIVITY.

(a) Scope.

This Act applies to covered election proceedings under state law, including proceedings in state courts, before state or local election bodies, and before state or local entities authorized to issue civil subpoenas, audit demands, inspection demands, or noncriminal investigative requests relating to an election.

(b) Preserved activity.

Nothing in this Act limits a good-faith report, ballot-specific voter remedy, recount, audit, contest, public-records request, criminal investigation or prosecution, or the authority of a court or election tribunal to provide relief for a proven violation of law.

(c) Relief-based trigger.

This Act applies according to the relief sought or reasonably foreseeable procedural effect of the proceeding, not solely according to the identity of the filer.

SEC. 5. SPECIAL MOTION TO SCREEN COVERED ELECTION PROCEEDING.

(a) Motion authorized.

A party, election official, governmental entity, affected candidate, affected voter, or custodian of sensitive election material may file a special screening motion in a covered election proceeding.

(b) Pre-election timing limitation.

A special screening motion may not be filed with respect to a future election scheduled to occur more than 180 days after the date of the motion, unless the motion is directed to a request for immediate access to sensitive election material or another present risk to ballot secrecy, voter privacy, chain of custody, or election security.

(c) No post-election cutoff.

No fixed post-election time limit applies to a special screening motion. After the election occurs, a special screening motion may be filed in any covered election proceeding that seeks or materially relates to election-disruptive relief, counting, tabulation, auditing, recounting, canvassing, certification, elector appointment, election contest, validity of the election result, or access to sensitive election material.

(d) Time for filing.

Subject to subsections (b) and (c), a special screening motion shall be filed as soon as practicable. A court or tribunal may permit later filing for good cause or where the election-disruptive character of the proceeding becomes apparent after filing.

(e) Required early showing.

Upon filing of a special screening motion, the person seeking election-disruptive relief or access to sensitive election material shall make a prima facie showing of legal authority, timeliness, particularized material facts, admissible evidence or a verified factual proffer, materiality, remedy fit, necessity of any intrusive process or sensitive-material access, and absence of improper purpose.

(f) Court or tribunal action.

If the required showing is not made, the court or tribunal shall dismiss, deny, narrow, stay, condition, quash, modify, or otherwise control the proceeding, demand, subpoena, inspection, audit, or request to the extent necessary to prevent election-disruptive relief, unauthorized access to sensitive election material, or abuse of process.

SEC. 6. AUTOMATIC STAY OF INTRUSIVE PROCESS.

(a) Stay.

Upon filing of a special screening motion, discovery, subpoenas, inspections, audits, forensic access, equipment access, ballot access, source-code access, and access to sensitive election material shall be stayed until the court or tribunal resolves the motion.

(b) Narrow exception.

The court or tribunal may authorize limited discovery or inspection before resolving the motion only upon a finding that the discovery or inspection is narrowly tailored, necessary to test a specific colorable and material claim, and subject to adequate protection for ballot secrecy, voter privacy, chain of custody, and election security.

SEC. 7. EMERGENCY RELIEF FINDINGS.

A court or tribunal may not issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, stay, impoundment order, certification delay, elector-appointment delay, extraordinary audit order, or other election-disruptive relief unless it makes written findings that the movant is substantially likely to succeed on a legally authorized claim, the alleged defect is material, irreparable injury is not primarily caused by the movant's delay, no narrower lawful remedy is adequate, the relief is compatible with applicable election deadlines or necessary to remedy a proven violation of law, and the relief will not unnecessarily impair voters, election personnel, ballot secrecy, voter privacy, chain of custody, or election security.

SEC. 8. SENSITIVE ELECTION MATERIAL PROTECTION.

A court or tribunal authorizing access to sensitive election material shall enter a protective order or equivalent directive that limits access to persons with a demonstrated need, prohibits unauthorized disclosure, preserves ballot secrecy and chain of custody, prevents disclosure of source code, credentials, security logs, keys, facility plans, or exploitable security information except under secure conditions, requires secure storage and return or destruction of copies, and imposes sanctions for violation.

SEC. 9. FEES, COSTS, AND SANCTIONS AT SCREENING OR DISPOSITION.

(a) No automatic penalty for losing.

A person may not be sanctioned under this Act solely because an election claim, motion, petition, demand, or request is denied.

(b) Sanctions authorized.

The court or tribunal may award reasonable attorney's fees, costs, public costs, or other appropriate sanctions if it finds that a filing, request, subpoena, audit demand, discovery demand, or emergency-relief request was frivolous, knowingly unsupported, presented for improper purpose, materially based on false factual allegations, legally foreclosed by binding authority, maintained after a defect was identified, or used to harass, delay, or obtain unauthorized access to sensitive election material.

(c) Additional authority preserved.

This Act supplements and does not limit state rules of civil procedure, attorney-discipline rules, contempt authority, public-records protections, election-code remedies, or inherent judicial or tribunal authority.

SEC. 10. LATER-DISCOVERED IMPROPER-PURPOSE SANCTIONS.

(a) Independent post-disposition motion.

A motion under this section is an independent post-disposition motion for sanctions and ancillary relief. The motion may be filed whether or not a special screening motion under section 5 was previously filed, granted, denied, withdrawn, or resolved on other grounds.

(b) Ancillary jurisdiction after termination.

The court or tribunal retains ancillary jurisdiction to resolve a motion under this section after dismissal, remand, voluntary dismissal, settlement, denial of emergency relief, final judgment, or other termination of the covered election proceeding.

(c) Time for motion.

Within one year after final disposition of a covered election proceeding, or within 180 days after discovery of material evidence of improper purpose, whichever is later, a party, governmental entity, election official, affected candidate, affected voter, or custodian of sensitive election material may move for sanctions under this section.

(d) Standard.

The court or tribunal may impose sanctions if clear and convincing evidence shows that the proceeding, filing, civil subpoena, discovery request, inspection demand, audit demand, noncriminal investigation demand, or request for emergency relief was materially presented, maintained, coordinated, or used for an improper purpose.

(e) Relevant evidence.

Relevant evidence may include communications, funding arrangements, concealed coordination, inconsistent public and tribunal representations, knowingly false factual assertions, fundraising representations, links to certification delay, links to elector-appointment disruption, or efforts to create a false predicate for governmental action.

(f) Relief.

Sanctions may include attorney's fees, public costs, restitution for election-administration expenses, referral to disciplinary authorities, civil penalties where authorized by law, restrictions on future emergency election filings absent leave of court, protective orders, and referral to prosecuting authorities where criminal conduct may be implicated.

(g) Due process.

No sanctions may be imposed under this section without notice, an opportunity to respond, and an evidentiary hearing where material facts are disputed.

SEC. 11. EXPEDITED REVIEW.

A court or appellate court shall expedite to the greatest practicable extent any proceeding involving election-disruptive relief, access to sensitive election material, a special screening motion, or sanctions under this Act.

SEC. 12. UNIFORM APPLICATION.

This Act applies without regard to the party, candidate, office, ballot measure, viewpoint, ideology, or anticipated electoral outcome involved.

SEC. 13. RELATION TO OTHER LAW.

This Act supplements and does not narrow any lawful recount, contest, noncriminal audit, noncriminal investigation, public-records, voter-remedy, criminal, disciplinary, or judicial procedure. Where a more specific election statute provides greater protection against abuse, delay, unauthorized access, or improper disclosure, the more protective provision controls.

SEC. 14. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision or application of this Act is held invalid, the remainder shall not be affected.

Budgetary Impact Statement

Administrative workload is possible; no new appropriation is specified.

Note: Preliminary ARRP assessment only; not a CBO, OMB, agency, or legislative-counsel score.

Drafting Notes

• The proposal is Anti-SLAPP-style: it adapts early screening, discovery stay, burden clarification, fee-shifting, and sanctions to election-disruptive proceedings.
• The special motion is motion-invoked, not automatic.
• A pre-election timing bar prevents the motion from being filed for elections more than 180 days away, except where immediate sensitive-material access or a present security/privacy risk is at issue.
• The Act imposes no fixed post-election cutoff; post-election availability depends on functional relation to the election result, election administration, or sensitive election material.
• Section 10 is expressly independent of the special screening motion and survives termination of the underlying proceeding.
• State versions should be checked against state Anti-SLAPP provisions, court-rule authority, separation of powers, open-records clauses, ballot-secrecy provisions, and election-contest statutes.
• State versions govern state courts, state tribunals, and state-law process. If a state-law election dispute is removed to or otherwise proceeds in federal court, the federal counterpart should control the federal-court procedure. After Berk v. Choy, states should not assume that a state-created election-screening rule will apply in federal court unless Congress has supplied the federal procedure.
• The July 3, 2026 ELEC-004 boundary cleanup preserved the distinction between civil, administrative, legislative, audit, subpoena, and inspection-process safeguards on the one hand and criminal-investigative process on the other. Any adopting state should separately review whether and how the model interacts with state criminal subpoenas, search warrants, grand-jury process, prosecutor authority, and law-enforcement investigations. Federal criminal-process guardrails are now tracked separately in ELEC-014.

Source Notes

• Source review should compare each adopting state's election-contest, court-rule, public-records, ballot-secrecy, and Anti-SLAPP statutes; the federal counterpart is ELEC-004. For state Anti-SLAPP variation, review jurisdiction-specific statutes and secondary surveys such as the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press Anti-SLAPP guide.
• The Ohio Organizing Collaborative FBI-search reporting is ELEC-014 source-development material, not a model for automatic state-law regulation of criminal-investigative process without separate state constitutional and criminal-procedure review.